In this paper we develop a technique for proving determinacy of classes of the form ω 2 -Π
. This bridges the gap between previously known hypotheses implying determinacy in this region.
Introduction
We work towards proving the following theorem (the relevant definitions can be found in the next section): This is thus an extension of ω 2 -Π
1
The much stronger principle of 0 † was found to imply Det((ω 2 + 1)-Π ) from the same hypothesis. Nonetheless a weaker hypothesis was sought and found in [15] , the paper on which this is based:
Theorem (Welch) . There exists a clever mouse iff Det(ω 2 -Π 1 1 ).
A clever mouse is a certain type of iterable model. Principles such as 0 and 0 † can be viewed in terms of mice, as well, so this result in some sense exists on the same continuum.
The difference hierarchy is already a refinement of the projective hierarchy, here, so we consider further refinements; if Γ ⊆ Π with the final set in the ω 2 + 1-sequence being constrained to being Γ. Using the methods in [15] , we find that such results are closely connected to the determinacy of a class related to Γ which we call Γ. This is the analogue of Γ in a larger space, arising from the auxiliary game used in Section 4 , and in Section 2.2 we will spend some time developing the theory of this space.
The way we will prove Theorem 1.1 is via the following: Theorem 1.2. Let Γ be an arithmetic pointclass. Suppose there exists a class C of Σ n generating indiscernibles for a theory T such that for any c ∈ [C] ω , any Γ game has a Σ n -definable winning strategy in the smallest transitive model of T containing c. Then Det(ω 2 -Π 1 1 + Γ).
We will define exactly what generating indiscernibles are in Section 3, where we will also show their existence, and Theorem 1.2 will be proved in Section 4, where Γ is will be defined implicitly. Finally in Section 5 we will prove the determinacy of Γ for each Γ mentioned in 1.1 in the relevant model. Section 2.1 contains definitions of the difference hierarchy and our refinements to it, as well as some small lemmas that help in establishing the determinacy of dual classes. Readers familiar with the difference hierarchy may wish to skip that section except for the main Definition 2.2. Section 2.2 contains essential definitions required to complete the determinacy proofs, but the material closely mirrors the usual effective descriptive set theory. Sections 3 and 4 are independent of one another and can be read in either order, with the exception of Definition 3.1.
Definition 2.1. Let M "F is a normal measure on κ", where F is, in V , the closed-unbounded filter on κ. Then the Q-structure of M at κ is:
where θ is largest such that:
"F is normal, and the club filter on κ."
We will not make extensive use of this material and haven't changed much from [15] , so we omit the majority of the details, commenting rather on the changes where they exist.
The next two subsections introduce more notation as well as the required generalisations.
The Difference Hierarchy and Refinements
The difference hierarchy was developed by Hausdorff, and a discussion can be found in [6] . We first cover the basic case, then develop the refinement we are considering and prove some basic lemmas.
Following the nomenclature of [13] , let us fix Γ to be an adequate pointclass closed under countable intersection in some ambient Polish space X , for instance in the intended case, the class of Π 1 1 sets in Baire space, ω ω . Then, if α is a countable ordinal we denote the αth level of the difference hierarchy on Γ by α-Γ: a pointset A is in α-Γ iff there is a sequence A ξ | ξ ≤ α , with each A ξ ∈ Γ and A α = ∅ such that:
x ∈ A ↔ the least ξ such that x / ∈ A ξ is odd.
In which case we say the sequence A ξ witnesses that A ∈ α-Γ. Since Γ is assumed to be closed under countable intersections we can take the sequence to be downwards-closed, that is A α ⊇ A β if α < β, by rewriting A β as α≤β A α if necessary. The definition of the difference hierarchy ensures that intersections with previous members of the sequence does not affect the resulting set A. These pointclasses serve as a further stratification in the Borel hierarchy; each α-Π 0 n is strictly between Π 0 n and ∆ 0 n+1 as long as α is countable, by a result of Hausdorff. Note while we can consider pointclasses Γ that are not closed under countable intersections, say Σ 0 n , then already ω-Σ 0 n captures all of the Π 0 n+1 sets, so this is not as interesting, and the results below become trivial. We can make the hierarchy even finer by restricting the final set in the witnessing sequence. We adopt the following notation for this: Definition 2.2. If Λ ⊆ Γ is a pointclass, we say A ∈ (α-Γ) + Λ iff there is a sequence A ξ | ξ ≤ α + 1 witnessing that A ∈ (α + 1)-Γ, with A α ∈ Λ. Note that A α+1 is still ∅.
With this notation it is clear that α-Γ + Γ is just (α + 1)-Γ, but for general Λ we end up with a different pointclass.
We now present a couple of elementary results about these refinements to the difference hierarchy. Let ¬Γ denote the dual class of the pointclass Γ.
Lemma 2.3. If λ is a countable limit ordinal, then the dual class, ¬((λ-Γ) + Λ) = (λ-Γ) + ¬Λ Proof. Let A α | α ≤ λ + 1 witness that A c ∈ (λ-Γ) + Λ, and we want to find a sequence witnessing that A ∈ (λ-Γ) + ¬Λ. Define the sequence B α | α ≤ λ + 1 as follows:
B η = X when η < λ is zero or a limit ordinal
So assuming λ > ω, the sequence looks like:
X , A 1 , A 2 , . . . , X , A ω , . . . , (A λ ) c , ∅
With the whole space X inserted at zero and each limit position below λ. Now, this sequence is a witness that some set is in (λ-Γ) + ¬Λ, since it is of the correct length and B λ ∈ ¬Λ. Denote this set B and we show A c = B. Let x ∈ X , then let α be the least ordinal such that x / ∈ A α . By construction, the least β such that x / ∈ B β is α + 1, unless α = λ + 1 in which case β = α − 1. In either case x ∈ A c ↔ x ∈ B. We've shown that ¬((λ-Γ)+Λ) ⊆ (λ-Γ)+¬Λ, but note that we can apply the same argument to get that ¬((λ-Γ) + ¬Λ) ⊆ (λ-Γ) + Λ, since ¬¬A = A. Hence since taking dual classes preserves subsets, ((λ-Γ) + ¬Λ) ⊆ ¬((λ-Γ) + Λ).
For a pointclass Γ, ∆(Γ) denotes the self-dual pointclass, Γ ∩ ¬Γ.
Lemma 2.4. If λ is a countable limit ordinal, then ∆((λ + 1)-Γ) = λ-Γ + ∆(Γ)
Proof. Note that one inclusion is clear from the above, since:
Let A ∈ ∆((λ + 1)-Γ), so there are sequences C α | α ≤ λ + 1 and D α | α ≤ λ + 1 witnessing respectively that A and A c are in (λ + 1)-Γ. We construct a new sequence B α | α ≤ λ + 1 witnessing that A is in λ-Γ + ∆(Γ). Firstly define:
. This involves checking that this sequence gives us back A, and that each member of the sequence is in the correct pointclass. We know that each B α ∈ Γ since Γ is closed under intersection, and so the sequence at least witnesses that some set B is in (λ + 1)-Γ. We are left with showing that A = B and that B λ ∈ ∆(Γ).
Suppose that x is not in every B α , for α < λ. Then suppose α 0 is the least such ordinal. If α 0 is a limit then certainly x / ∈ A and x / ∈ B. Otherwise α 0 = β + 1 and B β+1 = D β ∩ C β+1 is the first set in the B α sequence that x does not belong to. Hence either D β or C β+1 is the first of the D α s or C α s that x does not belong to and, inspecting the parity of the ordinals, we have that
Hence consider the case when x is in B α for every α < λ. By construction then, x is also in every C α and D α for α < λ. Then the least γ such that x / ∈ C γ is either λ or λ + 1 (recalling that C λ+1 = ∅.) But if δ is similarly least such that x / ∈ D δ , this can also only be λ or λ + 1. Since the C α s and D α s witness that A ∈ (λ + 1)-Γ and A c ∈ (λ + 1)-Γ, we have
Note we only showed this when x is in each earlier C α and D α , but since the sequences are nested downwards, this is the only way x can be in C λ or D λ . Hence C λ = (D λ ) c and so B λ = C λ ∈ ∆(Γ) as required. This gives us that ∆((λ + 1)-Γ) ⊆ λ-Γ + ∆(Γ) and so completes the proof.
Together these results will help extend the pattern down in the Borel hierarchy, that if we know Det(Σ 0 n ), say, we get the dual class, Det(Π 0 n ), for free. Hence in the cases we are considering, having proved Det(ω 2 -Π 
Effective Descriptive Set Theory with Uncountable Spaces
The auxiliary game we construct to prove Det(ω 2 -Π 1 1 + Γ) has a payoff set in the space (ω × ℵ ω ) ω . While it's not hard to see that such a set will be in the boldface counterpart of Γ in this space, we will need a closer analysis than this.
Firstly, we need to know that the payoff set is at least definable over the weak models for which we have indiscernibles, and secondly proving determinacy in these models requires tools from effective descriptive set theory. Effective descriptive set theory is defined in terms of computable functions on ω, which will not suffice when working with an uncountable space. We therefore need to generalise the theory and reprove several basic results in the uncountable context. Let T * be the tree F <ω for F = ω×ℵ ω . This will be the tree for the auxiliary game.
Definition 2.5 (Generalised Recursive Pointclasses). Define the following structure, the analogue of the hereditarily finite sets for classical recursion theory:
R is called generalised-recursive if its complement is also of this form.
Remark. Compare this with HF , over which the computably enumerable relations on ω are Σ 1 , or to α-recursion theory which considers subsets of α. This can be seen as extending α-recursion theory to subsets of α ω , where we in particular take α = ℵ ω .
A coding of (ℵ ω ) <ω into ℵ ω will allow us to talk about generalised-recursive relations on T * itself. Since H is closed under Gödel pairing, the Gödel pairing function G on ℵ ω is total and hence ∆ H 1 , allowing consideration of such relations. Definition 2.6 (Generalised Kleene Pointclasses). Then for a predicate P :
We then define the generalised analytic sets:
And the Σ Remark. The notion of computability is still the only difference with the usual lightface hierarchy; the subsequent levels are still built by (generalised) recursive unions, and complementation. Note that we take countable unions so as to align this hierarchy with the usual Borel hierarchy.
The following two propositions are obvious relationships between these pointclasses and the usual pointclasses.
Proof. The first inclusion is seen by an easy induction starting with the observation that Σ set of basic open sets, which is thus also a Σ 1 (H) set. The second inclusion follows directly from the definition.
Proof. For the first we need to observe that [T * ] is a metrizable space, hence Σ We note at this point that ultimately we will be interested in the analogue of H built on some sequence c ∈ [ℵ ω ] ω instead of ℵ i i∈ω . For concreteness we present this section in terms of the ℵ i s, since this doesn't change anything. For the rest of this section, by "admissible" we mean "admissible in the language of set theory augmented with constants c;" for now they will be interpreted as the ℵ i s but this need not be the case in general.
Lemma 2.9. If R is a generalised-recursive well-founded relation and M is admissible with H ∈ M , then rk R ∈ M .
Proof. If R is ∆ 0 1 and wellfounded, then let
For p, q ∈ S let p < R q if either p q or, for i the least point where p i = q i , p i < q i . Then < R wellorders S, is generalised-recursive and ot < R is at least rk R.
Now we need to show that the order-type of a generalised-recursive wellorder-a generalised-recursive ordinal -is contained in M . Let α = On ∩ M , hence α > ℵ ω is an admissible ordinal and N = L α [ ℵ i i∈ω ], ∈, ℵ i i∈ω is admissible. Now, since < R is definable over H, it is an element of L (ℵω)+1 [ ℵ i i∈ω ], ∈ , ℵ i i∈ω ⊆ N . By admissibility (i.e. recursion) let f be a Σ N 1 order-preserving bijection between < R and ot(< R ). Hence ot(< R ) ∈ N , and On ∩ M = On ∩ N .
Let R be such a tree with n = m = 1 for simplicity, then the set of branches of R is:
Now, being Σ 
Where A Y is the Σ 1 (H) set witnessing that Y is Π 0 1 . So let R consist of all elements n, a , p such that ∀m ≤ |p| n, a , p m / ∈ A Y , so that R is a tree, is Π 0 1 and x * (n) = a ⇐⇒ ∃y n, a , y ∈ [R].
For n, a ∈ ω × F and a tree R ⊆ ω × F × T * , denote by T n,a the n, a 'th part of R, that is, {p ∈ T * | n, a , p ∈ R}. Then the above lemma says that x * is Σ 1 1 iff there is a Π 0 1 tree R such that x * (n) = a ⇐⇒ R n,a is illfounded (the reverse direction being obvious.)
Of course, the lemma extends easily to relations
where e is a fixed generalised-recursive coding of F into T * . Put more succinctly,
iff there is a generalized-recursive tree R ⊆ T * × T * such that:
where R x = {y ∈ T * | x |y|, y ∈ R}.
Proof. This is essentially the Spector-Gandy theorem for elements of [T * ] instead of 2 ω . Let M be an arbitrary admissible set containing H. By the above find R ⊆ ω×F ×T * , a Π 0 1 tree such that x * (n) = a ⇐⇒ R n,a is illfounded. R is Π 1 definable over H, hence ∆ 1 definable over M , and so by ∆ 1 separation in M , R ∈ M . Let ϕ( n, a ) be the Σ 1 formula:
Then R n,a is wellfounded and an element of M , so by admissibility there is γ < On ∩ M and g : R n,a → γ witnessing the fact, hence ϕ( n, a ) holds in M . On the other hand if M ϕ( n, a ) then R n,a is really wellfounded and so
Corollary 2.12. Under the same hypotheses, x * is an element of any admissible set which itself contains an admissible containing T * .
Proof. Let M ∈ N be admissible and contain T * . Then x * is definable over M and M ∈ N is transitive. Hence, since the satisfaction relation is ∆
Remark. This conclusion remains true if x * is a Σ The following is then a weak analogue of the Kleene Basis Theorem in our setting:
1 and non-empty, then X * has an element definable over any admissible set M containing T * .
Proof. In light of the above, it will suffice to show that X * has an element which is recursive in some Σ ]. This will then be definable over any M which is admissible and contains
Hence any infinite branch of T determines an element of X * , and we need to find such a branch in M . Define P to be the set of elements of T which can be extended to an infinite branch:
1 by definition, so by the Spector-Gandy theorem for T * × T * , we have that P is Π M 1 . Then the leftmost path through P is defined by recursion by: y(n) = the least a ∈ F × F such that (y n) a ∈ P Which is definable from P and hence over M , and the left part of y is an element of X * .
Remark. It would be natural to consider the more direct analogue of Kleene's Basis Theorem by finding a Σ sets, but for our purposes, the above suffices and is more expeditious.
We also note that Shoenfield Absoluteness holds for these models:
, then A is absolute for models M as considered above for which a ∈ M .
Proof. Note we are now concerned with the usual Σ 1 2 sets, so the crucial things to know are that firstly Σ 1 2 (a) sets are ω 1 -Suslin, and secondly that the Shoenfield tree can be ranked in our models. (See, for instance, the final remarks in [8] , 13.15.) Thankfully, the Shoenfield tree is easily generalised-recursive; it is defined as: 
HenceT is also ∆
and with minor modification, the method of Lemma 2.9 shows that wellfoundedness of such trees is absolute for M . But this is just what is needed to prove Shoenfield's absoluteness theorem.
3 Obtaining Indiscernibles
Introduction
We aim to define a notion of Prikry forcing which, when executed over a model of KP n yields a generic extension which is also a model of KP n , and which satisfies a form of generating indiscernibility. This is all a straightforward checking that the forcing can be defined over the model and preserves KP n . First we define the indiscernibility principle we are interested in: Definition 3.1. A closed-unbounded class of ordinals C is a class of Σ n generating indiscernibles for the theory T if, for any c, d
And first of all we seek to prove: Theorem 3.2. If there exists a non-trivial mouse which is a model of KP n , then there exists a class of Σ n generating indiscernibles for KP n .
Fix a mouse
Let us fix some terminology for the remainder of the section:
. .} be the class of iteration points of M by F , and let c = {c 0 , c 1 , . . .} ∈ [C] ω be any fixed ω-sequence of them. Then let λ be such that the measurable cardinal of M λ , the λth iterate, is sup c, π : M → M λ the iteration map. With E λ , F λ the filter sequence and top measure of M λ , respectively, let θ be such that
Now note that by Σ n separation we may apply Los' theorem to Σ n formulae, so these ultrapowers preserve Σ n sentences, and hence C is a set of Σ n indiscernibles for M λ .
We use the notation X p, for sets of ordinals X, p to mean X \ (sup p + 1).
Lemma 3.4. Let p = {c 0 , . . . , c k } and e ∈ [C] <ω be a finite set of iteration points with max e < c k . Let X ∈ F λ be Σ n -definable in M λ from π(f ), e, p. Then X ⊇ C p.
Proof. By the properties of iterated ultrapowers, the measure 1 set X must contain an end-segment from C, which, as remarked above, is a set of Σ nindiscernibles for M λ . Thus X contains at least one indiscernible greater than all the indiscernible parameters in its definition, and so by indiscernibility, it contains any of them, i.e. any indiscernible greater than max p.
We need to know more, namely that KP n is preserved in the ultrapower.
Proof. First suppose that we know that the iterate M α KP n . We use the standard fact that the theory of KP n is equivalent to there being no Σ n -definable partial function, whose image of a set in the model is unbounded in the ordinals of the model.
Expanding f "A being unbounded, we get the Π n+1 formula:
. By cofinality of the ultrapower embedding π αα+1 , letĀ be such that A ⊆ π αα+1 (Ā). Then fix an arbitraryτ ∈ M α , and by applying Loś' theorem to the above for τ = π αα+1 (τ ):
and hence the formula ψ(ξ, γ) ≡ γ = sup{γ | ∃qϕ(ξ, γ , q)} defines a Σ n partial functionf , since the γ s are bounded by KP n . But then:
Thus we have shown that if M α Σ n -Separation, so too does M α+1 , and we just have to show that the limit models behave similarly. But if ν is limit and p, X ∈ M ν then take θ such that p = π θ,ν (p) and X = π θ,ν (X). By induction we may assume that if ϕ is Σ n ,B = {α ∈X | ϕ(α,p)} is an element of M θ . Hence
by elementarity, and we are done.
The Forcing
M λ will be the ground model for Prikry forcing, which will add the set of indiscernibles c to the generic extension, whilst preserving KP n . Definition 3.6. The partial order is the usual one for Prikry forcing:
This class is ∆ 1 -definable over M λ , but since F λ is not a set in the model, it is not a set forcing and so most of the work will be towards proving that KP n is preserved.
Rowbottom's theorem will be needed for several of the proofs in this section:
Lemma 3.7. KP proves that if κ is a measurable cardinal with normal measure F , and f is a partition of [κ] <ω into less than κ pieces, then there is a
Proof. This is essentially [7] , Theorem 10.22. Let F be a normal measure on κ, and let f partition [κ] <ω into less than κ pieces. If we can find measure one sets H n such that f is homogeneous on [H n ] n , then f is also homogeneous for
This is trivial for n = 1, so proceed by induction. Let
n . We fix this constant value to be i α . By KP the sequence {X α | α < κ} exists.
Let X be the diagonal intersection of the X α s, {α < κ | α ∈ γ<α X γ }, which is in F by normality, and is a ∆ 1 subset of κ.
n into γ < κ pieces, so again by hypothesis we know there is i ∈ I and a
The way we will use Rowbottom's theorem is, if we have a set
We now set up the basic forcing definitions in a way suitable for this purpose. This will require a return to ramified forcing, as originally conceived by Cohen (see [1] ) and used in [15] . Since the forcing we use will be a class forcing from the perspective of the model, our setting is more general than that envisaged by Cohen, and the use of theories stronger than KP means we extend Welch's work, too. In addition, accounts since Cohen's of ramified forcing have mostly been sketched, without full definitions or proofs, and the notation of Cohen's account is now outdated. For these two reasons, we set out the full definitions and proofs here. We will need to check that the usual properties of forcing hold in spite of our weak setting and the fact that we are using a class forcing. Definition 3.8. Let P, ≤ be Prikry forcing defined over M λ , that is:
We define a ranked forcing language, L F λ . First of all, we define constants for the language, which are representations of class terms and are intended to name sets in the generic extension. C 0 consists of {˙ c} ∪ κ λ , where˙ c is a constant symbol. If C α is defined then C α+1 consists of the class terms {x α | ϕ(x α )} where ϕ is a formula built up from: symbols ∈, =,˙ c; any element of C β for β < α; logical connectives and where any quantified variable is of the form ∃x β for β ≤ α. Take unions at limit stages, and let C = α< θ C α . The rank of one of these constants is the ordinal α such that it is an element of C α .
L F λ then consists of all formulae built from the symbols: ∈, =; unranked variables x, y, z, . . .; ranked variables x α , y α , z α for α < θ; connectives; quantifiers; and elements of C α for α < θ.
If ϕ ∈ L F λ then we say it is ranked if every variable in it is ranked, in which case its rank is the maximum of the ranks of quantified variables in ϕ and of the ranks of any constant terms occurring in ϕ.
We now define the weak forcing relation p * ϕ for p = p, X ∈ P and ϕ a sentence in L F λ :
1. p * x ∈ y iff x ∈ C α , y ∈ C β and:
(a) α = β = 0 and either x ∈ y ∈ κ or x ∈ p ∧ y =˙ c; or
; or else (c) α ≥ β and ∃z ∈ C γ for some γ, either β > γ or β = γ = 0 and
for α the maximum of the ranks of x and y.
We note that another notion of rank may be defined for formulae of the forcing language that are ranked as defined above, so that whenever the definition of p * ϕ refers to a formula ψ of the forcing language, this new rank strictly decreases. This makes the above recursive definition legitimate, and allows arguments about the forcing relation "by induction on ϕ."
ndefinable subsets of P and if, for every Σ n sentence ϕ of the forcing language, there is a p ∈ G such that p * ϕ ∨ p * ¬ϕ.
Remark. Note that the latter requirement also implies that such a generic decides every Π n sentence. Usually these two forms of genericity are equivalent, but here we will have to prove them both.
If we define an appropriate G, this will be the sequence c of iteration points we picked above. The generic extension is defined as
, c , and if there is only one G under discussion we write
This forcing relation obeys the usual properties:
Lemma 3.11.
1. For no p, ϕ does p ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ;
2. If p * ϕ and q ≤ p then q * ϕ;
Proof.
1-2 are standard and can be found in [1] Section IV.4.
3. The forward implication is obvious by 2 and the backwards implication is proved by induction on ϕ: Suppose first that ϕ is x ∈ y. If x, y ∈ C 0 and y ∈ κ, then, since forcing this doesn't depend on p, there's nothing to do. If ϕ is x ∈˙ c then we have to show that x ∈ p where p = p, X . But if not, then we can find q ∈ X \ {x} and then p ∪ {q}, X * ¬ϕ for a contradiction.
For every other case we use the induction hypothesis in the obvious way.
The reason for using the ranked forcing language is that it allows the forcing relation to be simply definable, as we prove in the following lemmas: Lemma 3.12. If p ∈ P and ϕ ∈ L F λ is a ranked sentence, then:
Proof. The first assertion is a re-statement of the Prikry lemma, but we will prove both statements in a simultaneous induction on the complexity of ϕ. First suppose ϕ is x ∈ y for x, y ∈ C 0 . Then certainly p * ϕ is ∆ 1 -definable. If p * ϕ, then set Y = X and we are also done with part 2. If not, then:
This is preserved when strengthening p, so in fact p * ¬ϕ, and again we can take Y = X for part 2. Now suppose we have proved the statement of the lemma for all formulae occurring in the definition of p * ϕ. We shall not carry out the proof in every case, but the following illustrate the most important and involved parts:
1. If ϕ is x ∈ y with x, y having rank α < β respectively, then let y = {z γ | ψ(z γ )}. Then the induction hypothesis says that for each d ∈ C γ there is an extension of p to p, Y d which decides ψ(d). The condition p x = p, Y x therefore decides ψ(x). By definition, p x * x ∈ y ⇐⇒ p x * ψ(x), so we are done.
2. If ϕ is ¬ψ, then by hypothesis extend p to p, Y in a ∆ 1 way such that p, Y ψ. But then p, Y also decides ϕ.
Likewise if we know p, Y * ψ then p, Y * ϕ and vice-versa, and if the former is ∆ 1 definable over M λ then so is the latter.
3. If ϕ is ∃x α (ψ(x α )) then define:
Suppose p, A does not decide ϕ. Hence there are conditions r, Y , s, Z , each stronger than p, A such that one forces ϕ and the other forces ¬ϕ.
Extending the shorter sequence if necessary, assume
k contains elements in S + and out of it. This is a contradiction and so p, A decides ϕ. Proof. Let p = p, X . If ϕ is ranked then for each q ∈ [X] <ω let Y q be the set produced by the above lemma given p ∪ q, X , ϕ. Then:
The forward direction is obvious since p ∪ q, Y q ≤ p, and the backward direction holds because then, taking any X ⊆ X we have that p ∪ q, X ∩ Y q ϕ, i.e. the set of extensions of p which force ϕ is dense.
This proves the first part, since the given formula is ∆ 1 , and for unranked formulae the result is a simple induction on Lévy rank.
When interpreting a formula of L F λ in M λ [ c], we interpret constant symbols from C α as the corresponding class term,˙ c as the predicate c and quantification over ranked variables ∃x α as bounded quantification ∃x ∈ J c α . Lemma 3.14 (Truth Lemma). If G is M λ generic for P and ϕ is a Σ n or a
Proof. Again this is proved by induction on ϕ, first for ranked formulae.
1. If ϕ is x ∈ y, we must check several cases, firstly assuming that p ∈ G, p * ϕ. If x, y in C α , C β , respectively, then firstly consider the case when α = β = 0. Here we only need to check that p * x ∈˙ c =⇒ M λ [ c] x ∈ c, which is true since by definition x ∈ p, and p ∈ G so p ⊆ c.
If α < β then p * ψ(x) for ψ the defining formula of y. By induction,
If y is an ordinal then every condition will force x ∈ y. Otherwise, find α, β andx ∈ C α ,ȳ ∈ C β such thatx,ȳ evaluate to x, y, respectively, in M λ [ c]. When α < β, the proof is straightforward by induction. If α ≥ β, we need to find γ < β,z ∈ C γ such that p * z = x ∧z ∈ȳ. But if x ∈ y then x occurs in the J c hierarchy strictly before y, and so is realised as a class term in C γ for γ < β. From here induction gives us what we want.
Where we use the induction hypothesis in the second equivalence.
3. If ϕ is ψ 0 ∧ ψ 1 then the argument is standard.
If ϕ is ¬ψ and p
Then, by the induction hypothesis there is q ∈ G(q * ψ). But there would then be a r ≤ p, q with r * ψ ∧ ¬ψ, which is impossible, completing the proof of the right-to-left direction.
On the other hand if M λ [ c] ¬ψ then there is by genericity at least a condition p ∈ G such that p ψ. If p * ¬ψ then we are done, and otherwise the inductive hypothesis for ψ would imply that M λ [ c] ψ, which is impossible.
If ϕ is ∃x
α ψ(x α ) and p ∈ G, p * ϕ then there is some x ∈ C α such that p * ψ(x), and hence
6. If ϕ is ∃xψ(x) and p ∈ G, p * ϕ then there is some α such that p * ∃x α ψ(x α ), and we can use the previous case. If
, and again we proceed as above.
We adopt the usual generalisation of diagonal intersection: 
Proof. We first prove that G c intersects every Σ n dense class of
}. This is Σ n , so by Rowbottom's theorem there is a measure 1 set
Since X is measure 1 it contains an end-segment of indiscernibles, and since it is definable from p and ϕ, it contains every indiscernible beyond p. Thus if p ⊆ c then p, X ∈ G c , completing the proof in this case.
Suppose ϕ is ∃xψ(x), with ψ a
<ω . Suppose inductively that, for each t ∈ C, there is an X ∈ F λ such that p, X ∈ G c and p, X ψ(t). Let:
This is ∆ k , so for each t, let X t be the M λ -least set satisfying θ, hence ∆ M λ k :
Here pr is the ∆ 1 function returning the set of all < M λ -predecessors of a set, following [2] where this is defined for L in II.3.5. Thus t → X t is ∆ M λ k and the following set is Π
Z is, by Σ k separation, an element of M λ and Z ⊇ ( c p), so p = p, Z ∈ G c . p ψ(t) for each t, so p ϕ, completing the induction and the proof.
Remark. Note that we may add finitely many elements of κ λ to c, and the above proof still works. This means that, if p = p, X ∈ P then G p∪ c is M λ -generic and contains p. Theorem 3.16. p ϕ ⇐⇒ p * ϕ, for Σ n formulae ϕ.
Proof. By p ϕ we mean the usual (semantic) forcing relation:
The right-to-left implication of the theorem is provided by the previous lemma.
For
We have now checked that the usual properties of forcing hold, and can use the relation as we normally would, safe in the knowledge that p ϕ is Σ n as long as ϕ is.
The Generic Extension
We now want to prove that, in the Σ n case of the Truth Lemma, it doesn't matter which initial segment of c we pick; we may always find a suitable measure-1 set Y to force the statement.
Lemma 3.17. For any p = {c 0 , . . . , c l } and y an arbitrary constant Σ n -definable from ranπ and finitely many elements of C, with the maximum such element c j < c l . Suppose ψ is Π n−1 . Then:
Proof. Fixing p, suppose the left hand side holds, and work in M λ . Then define:
if n = 1.) By hypothesis and the truth lemma, there is some extension of p in the generic that forces ∃zψ(z, y). Thus let q ⊆ c p, X ∈ F λ , z be such that p = p ∪ q, X ∈ G c , p ψ(z, y). Hence by indiscernibility, A contains any element of [C] <ω the same length as q, and thus
k ⊆ A. For such a q ∈ A let Y be the M λ -least such set, so that Y is Σ n -definable in M λ from y and p. Then, for q ∈ Y , let z q , X q be witnesses that q ∈ A.
The map q → X q is therefore Σ n (y, p)-definable, allowing us to define:
Y is then the diagonal intersection of measure 1 sets and is Σ n -definable, so
and we are done with the forward direction.
Hence suppose the latter. Then let p = p, Y be the M λ -least such condition, hence Σ n -definable in M λ from y, p. But by indiscernibility in the form of Lemma 3.4, Y ⊇ C p, so p ∈ G c by definition of the latter, and we are done.
As mentioned above, we need to check that the generic extension is a model of KP n .
Proof
wherever such a y ξ exists. We claim this defines a Σ
. First note that, if there is such a X ξ , then any other p, X ξ is compatible with p, X ξ and hence y ξ is well defined.
For the domain, suppose M λ [ c] ξ ∈ dom f . Then by Lemma 3.17 there is an X ∈ F λ such that p, X ξ ∈ dom f . Hence p, X ∩ X ξ ∈ dom f , i.e. p, X ∩ X ∃yf (ξ) = y, and so y ξ must be defined. The map ξ → y ξ is Σ M λ n (p, d) and so by KP n has a bound, let's say:
Now, A is Σ n definable and for each l we know we can find some r = c k+1 , . . . , c k+l such that r ∈ A, since we can find the corresponding τ p∪r as we found τ p . Thus by indiscernibility, A ∈ (F λ ) l . But then by Rowbottom in M λ , there is a set
l ⊆ A, and since all parameters in its definition are at most max p, A l ⊇ C p. Then if we letÃ = l A l , we have thatÃ ⊇ C p. By KP n , let τ bound all the ordinals τ p∪r for r ∈ [Ã] <ω . Hencep := p,Ã∩X ∈ G c and for any ξ ∈ dom f , if p∪q, B is an arbitrary extension ofp, we can find some r ∈ [B] <ω (and so q ∪ r ∈ [Ã] <ω ) such that ξ ≤ max r and so p ∪ q ∪ r, Y q∪r f (ξ) < τ p∪q∪r < τ . Hencep sup ranf < τ and we are done. 
Proof. By Separation in M λ [ c], we have that c is an element of M λ [ c]. All that remains to prove is minimality. Let N be a transitive model of KP n with c ∈ N . We claim that it is sufficient to consider N of the form J 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Since the class C of iteration points is a club, we just have to prove the indiscernibility.
Since a sentence of the language of
is a formula of set theory possibly mentioning the predicate symbolĠ, it is sufficient to take such a Σ n sentence ϕ and show that A n [ c] and A n [ d] agree on ϕ. Let M λ (respectively M λ ) be the iterate whose measurable cardinal is the supremum of c (respectively d.) Then, using that forcing ϕ is Σ n :
By Lemma 3.17
ZFC
The natural extension of these results to stronger mice will also be interesting. In this section, M is a non-trivial ZFC-mouse with normal measure F . We will prove:
Theorem 3.20. If there is a non-trivial mouse M ZFC then there is a class C of Σ ω generating indiscernibles for ZFC.
Thus these are full indiscernibles and any two models generated by an ω-sequence of them will be fully elementarily equivalent.
The procedure here is much simpler than in the preceding case. Since M ZFC again in the language of set theory augmented with a predicate for the filter F on κ, F is a definable set in M by Separation and Power Set. Thus the forcing is a set forcing and we can dispense with most of the analogues of the previous section. Define again M λ to be the λth iterate and have measurable cardinal sup c. 
Using the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Preserving substructures
Now let us abandon our previous notation and fix M = J F α , F to be an admissible structure of the kind discussed in [15] , that is, the Q-structure of a "clever" mouse, M 0 . Throughout this section, "admissible" will mean a transitive model of KP in the language containing the predicate F . Then M KP ∧ "F is a normal measure on κ" and M satisfies the following Σ 1 -Rowbottom property:
for Σ 1 formulae ϕ. Under these conditions it was proved in [15] that Prikry forcing over M preserves KP. Originally this was used under the hypothesis that M 0 is the least clever mouse, yielding that M λ [ c] (the forcing extension of the Q-structure of the λth iterate of M 0 ) is the least admissible set containing c. If M 0 is, say, the second clever mouse, then the situation changes as we would hope.
M λ , and we need to find r ≤ q ∈ D such that r ≤ p. Now, define the set of extensions of p which extend an element of D:
The latter case is impossible since, considering the condition p, Z ∈ (P) N , by predensity there is r ∈ [Z] <ω and some Z ⊆ Z such that p ∪ r, Z extends an element of D. That is to say, p ∪ r, Z ≤ q, Y r for some condition q, Y r ∈ D, i.e. r ∈ H. But now p, Z ∩ X is a condition in M λ such that, for any r ∈ Z ∩ X, the condition r := p ∪ r, Z ∩ X ∩ Y r ≤ p ∪ r, Y r extends a condition in D, so p is compatible with an element of D, which is what we wanted. . N < * N < * M , so N is therefore not clever as there are no clever mice between N and M . Then obtain a contradiction with the admissibility of J c γ as in [15] . The proof is exactly the same as the above indiscernibility proofs, relying on the fact that forcing relation for Σ 1 sentences is Σ 1 over M λ , as proved in [15] , and that the iterates are Σ 1 elementary.
Determinacy from Indiscernibility
Theorems 3.2, 3.20 and 3.25 provide the indiscernibles that are used, via the usual argument, to prove determinacy in this section. From now on, fix a pointclass Γ, n ∈ ω and a theory T , and suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 1.2 are satisfied, letting C be the set of generating indiscernibles.
First of all we need a kind of remarkability for generating indiscernibles. For c a set of ordinals, let c m denote the mth ordinal in the increasing enumeration of c. 
as is the same sentence but with γ 1 > γ 2 instead of γ 1 < γ 2 .
So, first suppose that γ 1 > γ 2 , and let d have the same order relationship with d as d does with c. By indiscernibility we also have γ 2 > γ 2 where γ 2 is defined in
. Hence by picking successive d i s in the same way, we end up with a decreasing sequence of ordinals -contradiction. Now suppose that γ 1 < γ 2 . There are two further sub-cases to consider, the first being when γ 2 < c j for some j. In this case, we can consider successive d , d , . . . where d , d have the same order relations as d, c and so on. Hence γ 2 (defined as before) is greater than γ 2 . But we can do this greater than c j -many times as C is a proper class, after which we necessarily have γ 2 > c j . But this is impossible by indiscernibility.
Finally suppose γ 2 > c i for all i. This is still expressible as a Σ n formula inside A T [ e] and so this time take successive sequences c so that sup c i approaches d i , for which we assume that the elements of c and d are cardinals, and hence limit points of C. Thus we can increase c d n -many times, so that γ 2 , which is less than d n , must be less than some c i , which cannot happen by indiscernibility.
Thus the only possibility we are left with is the one we wanted:
We now commence with the proof of Theorem 1.2, following the method established by Martin for proving determinacy in the Π
We set up an auxiliary game G * as in, for example, [11] . For x ∈ ω ω , let ≺ Note this mapping can also be taken to be recursive.
In the auxiliary game G * , each move is a pair (a i , η i ) such that a i ∈ ω and η i ∈ ℵ ω :
defining an auxiliary game tree, T * . The tree is definable in a ∆ A 0 way, and so by admissibility is an element of A.
For β < ω 2 and a play of this game,
Then we say that a play of G * is badly lost if some F ω·i+b is not an orderpreserving embedding of ω, ≺ ω·i+b x into ℵ i , < . A badly lost position is defined in the same way. If x * is a badly lost play, then there is a shortest badly lost position p * ⊆ x * witnessing that some F ω·i+b is not order preserving. We then say x * is badly lost for I if the least such b is even, otherwise it is badly lost for II, and denote the sets of such plays as B I and B II , respectively. Then, if x * is badly lost for I, II wins, and vice-versa. If x * is not badly lost then I wins if and only if x * ∈ B ω 2 . This implicitly defines the winning set of the game G * , which we denote A * . We now use the work of Section 2.2 to calculate the complexity of A * .
Proof. A * is defined as:
Where π is the projection function from [T * ] to ω ω :
Observe that π is continuous, and in fact generalised-recursive, and hence the assertion "π(x) ∈ A ω 2 " is Σ 
Now suppose that, by the hypothesis of Theorem 1.2, σ
* is a Σ n -definable winning strategy for G * . We argue that whichever player has the strategy σ * has a winning strategy for G. The strategy for G is defined by having the player "pretend" their opponent is playing G * , using indiscernibility to find that the integer moves returned by σ * are independent of the ordinals they choose to pretend were played. The auxiliary game is constructed so that the integers played constitute a winning play in G, so a strategy so defined will also be winning. We prove this below in the case when II has a winning strategy; the case for I is identical.
When constructing the pretend moves, we will only be considering sequences where I plays well, i.e. he plays so as not to be badly lost and further:
We now seek to establish the independence of moves from choice of indiscernibles. Suppose η 0 , . . . , η 2n and η 0 , . . . , η 2n are two sequences of indiscernibles and
are two positions consistent with σ * in which I has played well. We want that the number components of σ * (p) and σ * (p ) agree, and further that the ordinal components match, subject to certain conditions. To be precise: Lemma 4.3. With p, p as above, if σ * (p) = a 2n+1 , η 2n+1 and σ * (p ) = a 2n+1 , η 2n+1 then:
1. a 2n+1 = a 2n+1 2. If 2n + 1 = ξ γ r and whenever i ≤ n such that 2i = ξ β l , (for l, r ∈ ω and β < γ) we have that η 2i = η 2i , then η 2n+1 = η 2n+1 . That is, the ordinal part of the move σ * outputs is not dependent on I's ordinal moves η ξ β r for β ≥ γ.
Proof. This is directly analogous to [4] , Lemmas 0.8.1, 0.8.2. Let κ = κ m | m < ω be the increasing enumeration of {η 2i | i ≤ n} ∪ {ℵ i | i < ω}, with κ defined analogously but with the η 2i s. Also let J be the set {j < ω | ∃i(κ j = η 2i )}, the indices in the enumeration which are ordinals played by I. Since there have only been finitely many moves so far, this set is finite. Also, J = {j < ω | ∃i(κ j = η 2i )} since I plays well, so all his ordinals must be played into the appropriate block at the appropriate turn.
Since the ordinal sequences differ only finitely, A T [ κ] and A T [ κ ] have the same domains as A. In all of these structures, the game G * is definable from the ℵ i s, and the sequence ℵ i | i < ω is definable (uniformly in each structure) from J, which is finite. Likewise, the set of non-losing positions for II is Π 1 over all these structures (we already showed it is Π 1 over A), and is the same set in each.
II's integer move a 2n+1 is just defined by the Σ n formula a 2n+1 = (σ
For the second part we are dealing with ordinals, not integers, and therefore use the remarkability established in Lemma 4.1. Fix m to be the least number such that there exists i ≤ n and β > γ with κ m = η 2i = η ξ β l . Note that if such an η 2i does not exist then the result is trivial since all I's ordinal moves were the same between p and p . Now, if j < m then κ j = κ j (by hypothesis) and:
recalling that 2n + 1 = ξ γ r . But, together with the Σ n -definition of η 2n+1 in A T [ κ] from I's moves, which are in turn definable from {κ j | j ∈ J}. η 2n+1 has the same Σ n -definition in A T [ κ ] from {κ j | j ∈ J} and so we can apply Lemma 4.1 and η 2n+1 = η 2n+1 .
So we define II's strategy in G as usual: Suppose we have defined σ(p) for p of length at most 2n. Then let p = a 0 , . . . , a 2n be a position in G compatible with σ as defined so far, and suppose we can find p * = a 0 , η 0 , . . . , a 2n , η 2n , a position in G * consistent with σ * where I has played well. Then, set σ(p) = (σ * (p)) 0 . That this is well-defined will be shown in the following lemma:
Lemma 4.4. If σ * is a winning strategy for II in G * from the perspective of A, then σ is, in V , winning for II in G.
Proof. Let x = a 0 , a 1 , . . . be a play in G consistent with σ. If we can show that for any even γ < ω 2 , x ∈ β≤γ B β → x ∈ B γ+1 , and that if x ∈ β<ω 2 B β then x ∈ B ω 2 , then we will have shown that x / ∈ A, which is what we want. We do this by constructing the ordinals F β (i) in such a way that each F β is order-preserving. Inductively assume we have defined F β (i) for all i and all β < β, for some β ≤ γ + 1, and we will define the ordinals F β (i). Start by picking I's ordinals, i.e. when β is even: For each i < ω and
e. let I play well. We know this is possible because x ∈ B β and C is closed and unbounded below ℵ k+1 .
To pick II's ordinals, i.e. when β is odd, we use σ * inductively. Let p * be the position of length ξ β m whose number components come from x and whose ordinal components are picked as follows: η i is already defined by induction for i = ξ β m if β < β. Otherwise if i is odd, σ * specifies η i , whilst if it is even we let η i be an arbitrary element of C, maintaining that I plays well. This latter condition can always be met since C is closed and unbounded below each uncountable cardinal. Now, by Lemma 4.3, σ * (p * ) is the same regardless of the arbitrary indiscernibles we choose for I, so is well-defined, and we define η ξ β m as the ordinal component of σ * (p * ). We have now defined all ordinals η β i for β ≤ γ + 1. For β = γ + 1, since σ * is winning in A, this tells us that the function
is order-preserving for each k; otherwise the shortest x k where this was not possible would witness that II lost badly while following σ * . Since σ * is winning, this cannot happen. Hence ≺ γ+1 x = i∈ω ≺ γ+1 x i can be mapped order-preservingly into the ordinals, and x ∈ B γ+1 as desired.
All that is left is then to show that if x is in all the B β s up to ω 2 , then x ∈ B ω 2 . This is true in A since σ is defined from II's winning strategy σ * , so we just need to know that it is true in V . But the sentence "there exists a real x consistent with σ in all B β s except B ω 2 " is Σ 1 2 (σ), and thus by 2.14 is absolute for A. Hence if σ were not winning in V , it would not be winning in A, which is a contradiction.
Hence x / ∈ A, and σ is winning.
The corresponding proof for I is all but identical, and thus we have proved Theorem 1.2.
Individual Determinacy Proofs
To complete the proof of the main theorem, we need to show that determinacy of the class Γ holds in the models A T [ c], for the relevant theories T . The class Γ is precisely the class given by Lemma 4.2, and we now prove the determinacy of each of these classes in the corresponding model, which are the forcing extensions found in Section 3. Proof. Recall that, if II has a winning strategy in an open game, the canonical one is given by never playing so as to end up in a ranked position, where the rank of a position p is 0 if it is already lost for II (i.e. already in one of the basic open sets making up the winning set) and otherwise:
Det( Σ
By the recursion theorem, rk is a Σ KP 1 function. τ is then defined by
"a is ranked" is Σ 1 (it is equivalent to ∃ξ rk(a) = ξ) so this is Π 1 ∧ Σ 1 , as desired for the first claim. For the second claim, let N ∈ M with the latter admissible. If τ is not winning in M then some position p consistent with τ must have a game rank in M but not in N , so suppose p is such a position, with rank least. Then by definition,
But, fixing a, any such p a, b must thus also have a rank in N , since p is the rank-minimal position such that p does not have a rank in N . Hence by admissibility p can be ranked in N as sup b rk(p a, b ), which is a contradiction.
The following is essentially from [14] but translated into a set-theoretical form. The original proof uses Π 
game has a winning strategy definable over M by a boolean combination of Σ 1 formulae. Hence a further admissible set containing M will contain the winning strategy as an element.
Proof. Let A be Σ 0 1 and B be Π 0 1 , and fix the game G where player I is trying to get into A ∩ B. Now a winning strategy for the game with winning set A (and likewise for B) is definable over the admissible M 0 via a game-rank argument, but depending on who wins, is not necessarily a member.
For p ∈ T * , T *
p is the open neighbourhood of p. Suppose player I has no winning strategy to play into A ∩ B, and define the set z ⊆ T * :
z is thus a Σ 1 1 generalised real and an element of M by the generalised SpectorGandy theorem. The class of extensions of elements of z is Σ 0 1 (z) and thus has a winning strategy Π 1 ∧ Σ 1 -definable over M since z ∈ M . In fact the strategy must be for II, since a winning play for I would also be in A ∩ B, and I has no winning strategy there, by assumption. Call II's strategy τ 0 .
Define Then we define a winning strategy τ * for II by setting τ * (p) = τ 0 (p) whenever T * p ⊆ A, and τ * (p r) = τ p (r) when p is the shortest position such that
Thus if τ 0 leads II to a position p which will end up in A, she switches to τ p which will keep her out of B forever, thus winning. Since τ 0 and τ p are definable over M , so is τ .
This is definable over M by a boolean combination of Σ 1 formulae. If N is an admissible set containing M then τ 0 , τ p will be in N , and still be winning for their respective subgames. Hence τ ∈ N and is also winning.
Thus, since starting with the second-least clever mouse yields generating indiscernibles for such structures M , Theorem 1.2 applies, and we have proved Theorem 1.1 part 1. 
Being a minimal transitive model implies that A T [ c] has a parameterless Σ 1 Skolem function.
The determinacy proof is just the same as usual, first proved by Wolfe in [17] , and also found in [9] as Theorem 1.3.3., but we have to pay attention to how much separation and replacement we're using. For convenience, fix A to be A T [ c] for some arbitrary c (for example, the sequence of ℵ i s).
We first need to know the complexities of some standard concepts. Most importantly, "being a winning strategy" is ∆ 1 in a limit of admissibles: Lemma 5.3. The sentence "σ is a winning strategy for G(A; T * )" (for I, II or either player) is ∆ 1 over any admissible M satisfying:
2. ∃N ∈ M (N is admissible and σ ∈ N )
Hence the sentence "there exists a winning strategy for G(A; T * )" (for I, II or either player) is Σ 1 over A.
Proof. Let σ ∈ N ∈ M , with N, M admissible. Then certainly being winning is expressible by the Π 1 formula:
Note that checking x ∈ A for a generalised-arithmetic A is ∆ 1 over M since it is definable over H. Now we just need a Σ 1 formula. But note that the set {x | x * σ ∈ A} is Σ 1 1 and so by Theorem 2.13 if non-empty has an element definable over N , and hence in M , witnessing that σ is not winning. Thus if M is as required, the following sentence will do:
Again, everything inside the scope of the quantifier is ∆ 1 , so we are done with the first assertion of the lemma. The second assertion then follows trivially. Now let's examine quasi-strategies:
is not a win for I, then II's non-losing quasi-strategy is a Π 1 definable element of A.
Proof. "not being a win for I" is a Π A 1 property by the previous lemma, and in this case, II's non-losing quasi-strategy is Π A 1 :
We now proceed with Wolfe's proof, starting with the following Lemma:
Lemma 5.5. Let B ⊆ A with B ∈ Π 0 1 and A a generalised-arithmetic class of A. If I has no winning strategy for G(A; T * ), then in A there is a strategy τ for II such that for any play x ∈ τ , x contains a position p such that:
2. G(A; T * p ) has no winning strategy for I. Proof. Define C to be the set of plays such that no initial move satisfies both the assertions of the lemma, that is:
is a win for I)} Being a win for I is Σ 1 and the rest of the definition here is ∆ 0 , so C is Σ 1 -definable over A. To prove the lemma we just need a winning strategy for II in the game G(C; T * ), so suppose there isn't one. But C is closed; it is the complement of the union of basic open sets and so I must have a winning strategy, σ. Now, since G(A; T * ) is not a win for I, by the previous lemma II's non-losing quasi-strategy T is a Π A 1 element of A. Hence I has no winning strategy in G(A; T ). But since T doesn't restrict I's moves, σ restricted to T is still a winning strategy for G(C; T ). Denote σ's restriction to T by σ , and let x be any play consistent with σ . Then for every p ∈ T , and hence for any p ⊆ x, the game G(A; T * p ) is not a win for I since T is II's non-losing quasi-strategy. Hence we have shown that the second condition above holds for every p ⊆ x. Since we assumed that not both are true, then, every p ⊆ x satisfies T * p ∩ B = ∅. But B is closed so this means it contains x. Hence x ∈ B ⊆ A, but x was an arbitrary play consistent with σ , so σ is winning for G(A; T ), which is a contradiction.
The proof of the theorem now follows quite simply.
is not a win for I, and we will construct a winning strategy τ for II. The familiar idea is to build τ from countably many τ i , each given by applying the lemma with B set to A i .
Let τ 0 be the strategy given by the previous lemma for B = A 0 , and let p 0 be the shortest position consistent with τ 0 and q I satisfying both conditions stated in the lemma. We then simultaneously define p i and τ i by induction, for as long as p i is shorter than 2n.
Firstly:
the least strategy τ that wins G(C; T * p ), with C as defined in the previous lemma.
P (τ i , q I ) = the shortest position p ⊆ τ i * q I satisfying both conditions of the previous lemma.
(Here we interpret τ i * q I for the finite sequence q I as being all plays compatible with τ i where I played from q I his first n moves.) Then, if we have defined all strategies and positions up to τ i , p i :
Note that p i+1 (and hence τ i+2 ) will be undefined if the lemma would produce a position longer than 2n.
Let τ (∅) = τ 0 (∅). We define a winning strategy for II by recursion on length of position.
Suppose we have defined τ on all positions of length up to 2n, and let q be a position of length 2n + 1 compatible with τ . Let q I = q 0 , q 2 , . . . , q 2n , and use it to define τ i and p i as above, with k least such that p k is undefined. Then we define τ (q) = τ k (q). Note that S and P are Σ 1 and ∆ 0 over A, respectively, so this amounts to a Σ 1 recursion, giving τ a Σ 1 -definable element of A, so it just remains to show that τ is winning.
So let x be consistent with τ , so that we have positions p i ⊆ x for all i ∈ ω, with T * pi ∩ A i = ∅. Hence x ∈ T * pi for each i, and so x / ∈ i∈ω A i = A, so II wins, and τ is winning.
This gives us that, if I does not have a winning strategy in A, II does, and in fact it is Σ 1 definable. If I does have the winning strategy, we can in fact find a Σ 1 definable one because, by Lemma 5.3, "being a winning strategy" is ∆ 1 definable over A and thus the A-least such strategy is Σ Let A be a Σ 0 3 subset of T * , and we will want to show that A "G(A; T * ) is determined." We follow the specialised version of Davis' original proof as laid out in [16] . This in turn uses Martin's version, as in [9] , of the proof closely, but explicitly minimising the required strength. We note that Σ 2 -Sep is more than is necessary to effect this proof, so our proof is simpler than that in [16] .
As with Martin's proof, we start with a lemma that is applied repeatedly to build up a strategy to prove the theorem. We will have to ensure that the objects defined are elements of the structure A, and must allow for the added complexity coming from the use of the generalised pointclass Σ Proof. Let T be II's non-losing quasi-strategy, which is a Π 1 -definable set in A. Define a position p to be good if there is a quasi-strategyT ⊆ T p satisfying the above two properties. Goodness is a Σ 2 property, asserting the existence of a tree with properties 1. and 2., with 1. being ∆ 1 and 2. being Π 1 . The set of good positions H is therefore an element of A.
Denote byT the function with domain H, defined over A as:T (p) is the least quasi-strategy witnessing that p is good. This is Σ 2 definable by the existence of Σ 2 Skolem functions.
Let B = n D n , with each D n ∈ Σ 0 1 , and define the sets:
Thus each E n is a Π 2 set in A once we make the ∃p bounded in the usual way. The goal, then, is to prove that the initial position ∅ is good. This will be accomplished by showing that there is at least one E n for which I has no winning strategy in T . Following Martin, we first show that this does what we want, so assume that there is no winning strategy for I in the game G(E n ; T ) in A. Let T be II's non-losing quasi-strategy in this game.
We now define a quasi-strategyT .T firstly contains all p ∈ T until T p ⊆ D n . Then letting p be a minimal position such that T p ⊆ D n , note that p must be good. This is because, if p were bad the definition of E n implies I has a trivial winning strategy in G(E n ; T p ). But p is supposed to be in II's non-losing quasi-strategy, and hence upon reaching such a p we can includeT (p) intoT . Now we wish to show thatT is a witness in A to the initial position being good. Note firstly that T ∩ B = ∅, because either a play throughT remains in T (and so it is not in D n , hence not in B) or it goes throughT (p) which witnesses p's goodness, hence avoiding B.
We now need to show that G(A;T ) is not a win for I, so suppose otherwise and let σ ∈ A witness that. Every position p consistent with σ satisfies T p ⊆ D n : if not, then there is such a p withT p =T (p). ButT (p) is a witness to p's goodness in A, so G(A;T p ) is not a win for I in A.
By the definition ofT , then, all plays consistent with σ lie in T . Hence σ is also a winning strategy for G(A; T ) and, since A ⊆ E n , for G(E n ; T ). But this allows us the contradiction we want: Define a strategy τ for I in G(E n ; T ) by following σ until possibly reaching a point p / ∈ T . Then there is a strategy σ p winning for I in A (since T is non-losing in A), so let τ follow this strategy. This procedure is definable from σ and the strategies σ p , all of which are contained in A, and thus the strategy is in A for the desired contradiction.
We have now shown that, under the assumption that at least one game G(E n ; T ) is not a win for I, we have that ∅ is good as desired, and we need to show that this assumption is valid. Note that the above argument can be adapted to show that, if G(E p n ; T p ) is not a win for I, where:
then p is good. Hence suppose the lemma is false. We can thus assume that each G(E p n ; T p ) is a win for I (in A) since this is the only case in which we haven't proved the lemma. We then show that I has a winning strategy in G(A; T ) in A, contradicting the hypothesis of the lemma.
I starts by playing with the strategy from the previous lemma for G(E 0 ; T ). If we never reach a point p 1 with T p1 ⊆ D 0 then, if the play ends up in E 0 it must be in A. Otherwise all plays above p 1 are in D 0 , and I now must start playing according to the strategy for G(E p1 1 ; T p1 ). We now either end up in A or use the strategy for G(E p2 2 ; T p2 ). If this process terminates, then I has a winning strategy for some G(E pi i ; T pi ) and the only way for I to win in the game would be to get into A, giving a winning strategy in G(A; T ). If the process continues indefinitely, then I has landed in each D n and hence is in B ⊆ A.
It remains to show that the strategy thus defined is an element of A, so let's make our definitions above precise. Suppose q is an even-length position with q ⊇ p i , and that we have defined p i and σ i , but not p i+1 and σ i+1 .
where, if "otherwise," we set:
Thus σ is defined by a recursion on ω and is an element of A. But T is I's non-losing quasi-strategy in A and so this is a contradiction.
Proof. Now we are ready to prove the theorem. Let A = n∈ω A n , with each A n Π 0 2 , and suppose G(A; T * ) is not a win for I, and we show that II has a winning strategy definable by a Σ 2 -recursion over A which, by Σ 2 -admissibility is therefore an element of A. We apply the previous lemma repeatedly, substituting each A n as an instance of B, and the resulting quasi-strategies as instances of T .
First apply the Lemma with B = A 0 and T * , yielding a quasi-strategȳ T * ∈ A, which we shall now call T ∅ . Taking T ∅ to be the least such gives T ∅ a Σ 2 element of A.
The lemma tells us that G(A; T ∅ ) is not a win for I, so for any length-1 position p 1 ∈ T * , let τ (p 1 ) be some arbitrary, fixed move in II's non-losing quasi-strategy. Now let p 2 be a length-2 move consistent with τ as defined so far and apply the Lemma with B = A 1 and T = (T ∅ ) p2 , yielding a quasistrategy which we call T p2 , Σ 2 -definable from (T ∅ ) p2 and hence an element of A. Since the Lemma guarantees I still has no winning strategy in G(A; T * p2 ), for an arbitrary length-3 position p 3 , let τ (p 3 ) be an arbitrary move consistent with II's non-losing quasi-strategy there.
Continuing in this way defines a strategy τ for II by Σ 2 -recursion, and as noted above, this gives τ ∈ A. All that remains is to show that τ is winning. If x is consistent with τ then by construction it is in each T p2n , and T p2n ∩ B n = ∅ by the lemma, so ∀n ∈ ω(x / ∈ B n ), so x / ∈ A and is a win for II. Thus we have proved Theorem 1.1 part 3. To prove this, we refer to the work of Montalbán and Shore, [12] , Section 4, which in turn is a version of Martin's proof in Section 1.4 of [9] . Since that proof is long, needs very little modification and we have already seen how the arguments transfer from the ordinary case to determinacy of these auxiliary games, we will be brief.
Det(n-Π
Working in a minimal model A containing T * and satisfying KP n+1 , we have to ensure that all the objects defined in the proof of [12] exist in A.
First, let A be as follows:
A is m-Π Let s be a position in T * of length at most m, and S a subtree of T * . Let l = m − |s| and fix player x to be I if l is even and II otherwise, withx the opposite player. Then let B
x be B if x = I and B c otherwise, for any set B (taking complementation inside the ambient space, which is T * in the case of A x , but when considering the winning set of a game in the tree S, it is in S ). We define the predicates P s (S) by recursion up to m, exactly as in [12] :
Definition 5.9. P ∅ (S) holds iff there is a winning strategy for player x in G(A; S). P s (S) holds for |s| = n + 1 iff there is a quasistrategy U ⊆ S for player x such that 1. U ⊆ A x ∪ A (m−n−1),s(n) ; and 2. P s n (U ) fails.
Definition 5.10.
A quasistrategy U witnesses that P s (S) if it is as required in Definition 5.9. A quasistrategy U locally witnesses that P s (S) if either s = ∅ and U is a witness to P ∅ (S), or |s| > 0, U is a quasistrategy for player x and there is a D ⊆ S such that for every position d ∈ D, there is a quasistrategy R d ⊆ S d for x such that:
. For a position p ∈ S there is at most one position d ∈ D such that
These are technical conditions that are used in the proof to ultimately ensure determinacy. Many sets are defined using these conditions, so we will need to know the complexity, and thus that the sets are elements of A.
Proposition 5.11.
2. "U witnesses that P s (S) holds" is Π |s| 3. "U locally witnesses that P s (S) holds" is Σ |s|+1
Proof. Since "there is a winning strategy for x in G(A; S)" is Σ 1 over A (recall Lemma 5.3), P ∅ (S) is Σ 1 . Then if |s| = n + 1, the definition requires checking that there is a U such that ¬P s n (U ), so inductively the predicate overall is Σ |s|+1 .
The complexities of the other predicates follow straightforwardly as well.
Contrast this with Remark 4.3 of [12] , where the same concepts are noted to be Σ With this observation, the remainder of Montalbán and Shore's proof can be followed in A. Note that, whenever we define a set (of plays, or of positions) it is, in their proof, at most Σ 1 n+2 using their Remark 4.3. Consequently by our Proposition 5.11 the same sets are at most Σ 1 n+1 , indeed whenever their set is Σ m+1 , ours is Σ m . When it comes to define a function returning such sets, we use the fact that the A-least set satisfying a Σ m property is again Σ m .
Following their proof with these minor modifications, then, gives us: 
1.
A is Σ 0 1 iff there is a partial Σ 1 (H) function e : ℵ ω → ℵ ω where A = α T * p(e(α)) . The code for A is then 0, e , having coded e as an element of ℵ ω . This is possible because there are only ℵ ω -many such functions that are Σ 1 (H) definable with parameters from H.
Conclusions and Open Questions
The main result shows the adaptability of the technique originally invented by Martin for proving determinacy results on α-Π by one more set, but we could investigate the modifications to the difference hierarchy in [4] to see if more results are provable.
To the first question, we should not expect optimality in parts 1-3 of 1.1, since for those we either know that the determinacy proof holds in models weaker than the forcing extensions we consider, or have no reason to suspect otherwise. The problem is that we cannot preserve arbitrary theories when iterating and doing the forcing in Section 3, so even where we have optimal determinacy results (for instance, it is known that Det(Σ In the case of part 4, Montalbán and Shore show in [12] that we cannot even find an exact characterisation of Determinacy down in the Borel hierarchy, so we should not hope to find any in the refined difference hierarchy. However, we may rather hope to prove, as they did, that no exact correspondence can be found.
On the other hand we know that Borel determinacy requires almost the full strength of ZFC, with Martin's analysis showing that we should expect parts 5 and 6 to be nearly optimal.
